1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War by Benny Morris Page B
Authors: Benny Morris
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The Jews were compensated with additional territory in the Galilee. With these changes to the original UNSCOP majority plan, the prospective Jewish state was reduced to 55 percent of Palestine, with a population of some half a million Jews and an Arab minority of around 450,000. (Another hundred thousand or so Jews lived in Jerusalem, which was to be part of the international zone.)
On a6 October, Zionist officials assessed that there were twenty-three votes for partition and thirteen against.s0 Matters slightly improved by 25 November, when Subcommittee One's report was finally adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee. The vote was twenty-five for, thirteen against, and seventeen abstentions. This was still short of the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.
The numbers triggered alarm bells in Jerusalem, and the Jewish Agency Political Department, assisted by local branches of the World Zionist Organization, embarked on a world-embracing campaign to bring in the votes. The campaign proceeded along two tracks: direct Zionist lobbying to persuade individual governments and indirect efforts to persuade Washington to pressure other governments to vote for partition. Both campaigns moved into high gear on 24-25 November.
On 23 November Jamal Husseini, the AHC representative, was optimistic (though another member of the Palestinian delegation, Wasif anal, seemed less so when he said, "The Jews are the most cunning people among the nations of the world and on top of that they have the means. They bribed most of the delegates, but we do not have the money to bribe" ).si The British estimated that there were "twenty-five-twenty-seven votes for partition and fourteen or fifteen against it";82 on 26 November, their estimate was "30 ... for partition ... [and] IS against," but this excluded "the Siamese delegation, which has disappeared, or the Liberian, which may possibly cast its vote with the Arabs."x" It was touch and go.
Direct Zionist lobbying focused both on the governments at home and the delegations in New York, and a range of arguments, incentives, and disincentives were brought to bear. The underlying argument was the two-thousandyear history of Jewish suffering and statelessness, culminating in the Holocaust, and the international community's responsibility to make amends.
The Zionists faced a major challenge in the twenty-member Latin American bloc, the United Nations' largest, where the anti-Zionist influences of the Catholic Church-the Vatican opposed partition and Jewish statehood-and local Arab and German communities were strong, and where anti-American feeling, which affected attitudes to Zionism, was widespread, though the regimes themselves were dependent on and aligned with Washington. During April-May, the Latin Americans appeared to support the Zionist cause, or so it seemed to Jewish Agency officials. But by October, many were wavering or even antagonistic, due, the Zionists believed, to "a very intensive campaign [by the Arabs "and their friends" of] ... commercial pressure, diplomatic pressure, bribery"84 and to apparent US irresolution. Of the bloc, only "five or six" were definitely for partition, and two, Argentina and Cuba, were "committed" on the Arab side. Of the remaining thirteen, about half were leaning toward partition, and the rest were "inclined to abstain."85
In the Ad Hoc Committee vote of 25 November six Latin American countries abstained, Paraguay absented itself, and one (Cuba) voted against, as against twelve "ayes." In the following days, the Zionist directed their efforts toward the recalcitrant countries' UN representatives, who seem largely to have been left to their own devices on the Palestine questions"
Pecuniary considerations apparently affected the votes of one or two Latin American ambassadors (though documentation in this regard is hard to find). According to reports, one Latin American delegation voted for partition after receiving seventy-five thousand dollars;
On a6 October, Zionist officials assessed that there were twenty-three votes for partition and thirteen against.s0 Matters slightly improved by 25 November, when Subcommittee One's report was finally adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee. The vote was twenty-five for, thirteen against, and seventeen abstentions. This was still short of the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.
The numbers triggered alarm bells in Jerusalem, and the Jewish Agency Political Department, assisted by local branches of the World Zionist Organization, embarked on a world-embracing campaign to bring in the votes. The campaign proceeded along two tracks: direct Zionist lobbying to persuade individual governments and indirect efforts to persuade Washington to pressure other governments to vote for partition. Both campaigns moved into high gear on 24-25 November.
On 23 November Jamal Husseini, the AHC representative, was optimistic (though another member of the Palestinian delegation, Wasif anal, seemed less so when he said, "The Jews are the most cunning people among the nations of the world and on top of that they have the means. They bribed most of the delegates, but we do not have the money to bribe" ).si The British estimated that there were "twenty-five-twenty-seven votes for partition and fourteen or fifteen against it";82 on 26 November, their estimate was "30 ... for partition ... [and] IS against," but this excluded "the Siamese delegation, which has disappeared, or the Liberian, which may possibly cast its vote with the Arabs."x" It was touch and go.
Direct Zionist lobbying focused both on the governments at home and the delegations in New York, and a range of arguments, incentives, and disincentives were brought to bear. The underlying argument was the two-thousandyear history of Jewish suffering and statelessness, culminating in the Holocaust, and the international community's responsibility to make amends.
The Zionists faced a major challenge in the twenty-member Latin American bloc, the United Nations' largest, where the anti-Zionist influences of the Catholic Church-the Vatican opposed partition and Jewish statehood-and local Arab and German communities were strong, and where anti-American feeling, which affected attitudes to Zionism, was widespread, though the regimes themselves were dependent on and aligned with Washington. During April-May, the Latin Americans appeared to support the Zionist cause, or so it seemed to Jewish Agency officials. But by October, many were wavering or even antagonistic, due, the Zionists believed, to "a very intensive campaign [by the Arabs "and their friends" of] ... commercial pressure, diplomatic pressure, bribery"84 and to apparent US irresolution. Of the bloc, only "five or six" were definitely for partition, and two, Argentina and Cuba, were "committed" on the Arab side. Of the remaining thirteen, about half were leaning toward partition, and the rest were "inclined to abstain."85
In the Ad Hoc Committee vote of 25 November six Latin American countries abstained, Paraguay absented itself, and one (Cuba) voted against, as against twelve "ayes." In the following days, the Zionist directed their efforts toward the recalcitrant countries' UN representatives, who seem largely to have been left to their own devices on the Palestine questions"
Pecuniary considerations apparently affected the votes of one or two Latin American ambassadors (though documentation in this regard is hard to find). According to reports, one Latin American delegation voted for partition after receiving seventy-five thousand dollars;
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