huge. Not only do we have the example of the amount of effort that went into the Manhattan Project during the Second World War; there is also the limited success so far from whole countries that have been trying and failing to join the nuclear powers. What hope could a terrorist group have, where an entire country has failed?
However, terrorists could have some advantages over a legitimate state, in that they could obtain fissile material—most likely plutonium, which is produced by the nuclear industries of several countries—illegally, by theft, rather than attempting to purchase it openly or manufacture it. The construction of a traditional bomb itself requires sophisticated engineering and explosives expertise to get the explosive “lenses” that concentrate the impact correctly if plutonium is used—but it is conceivable that a well-funded terrorist group with access to the right expertise could manufacture a crude weapon.
Although plutonium is probably easier to get hold of illegally, the technical problems of making a bomb operate with it are significantly greater than with enriched uranium. Here, to quote nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez, “if highly enriched uranium is at hand it’s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion…. There would be a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material on the other…A high school child could make a bomb in short order.”
While Alvarez was probably exaggerating a little for effect, a bomb based on enriched uranium could easily be assembled in a garage laboratory. Of course this still leaves a terrorist group with the need to get its hands on enriched uranium. As the Manhattan Project and twenty-first-century examples like the Iranian nuclear program have proved, producing this is nontrivial. But enriched uranium exists in a number of countries around the world, some of them more open to black market deals than others—and its very existence makes it a potential target for theft.
However, the one disadvantage the terrorists have is that enriched uranium, unlike plutonium, which is a natural by-product of electricity-generating nuclear reactors, tends to be in the hands of the military. Uranium enrichment is a tricky, expensive, high-tech process, and there is no reason to have the substance unless you are building a weapon. The confinement of enriched uranium to military establishments does mean it is likely to be more securely stored than plutonium. But there is still the potential for terrorist access where military personnel are susceptible to bribes or threats.
On at least two occasions, quantities of around three kilograms of enriched uranium have been seized from individuals from the former Communist bloc who were attempting to smuggle the materials into the West. Remember that there is no other use for this material than for making a bomb, though it would require around sixty kilograms of highly enriched uranium to make a weapon. We have no idea how many such attempts to smuggle the material have got through undetected.
It seems to some analysts more likely that an existing bomb, from the arsenal of the former Soviet Union or from an area with complex politics like Pakistan, could fall into the hands of terrorists. This is a frightening possibility, though there are some safeguards. Most existing weapons, both U.S. and Soviet, have sophisticated mechanisms to avoid their being used by anyone other than their owners. It’s not impossible, but the probability is relatively low. Even so, the chance that terrorists could let off such a nuclear device is one that the U.S. government takes seriously.
In July 2009, the Committee on the Medical Preparedness for a Terrorist Nuclear Event, a group set up by the Institute of Medicine at the government’s request, held a workshop that produced a number of recommendations for coping with the impact of a nuclear blast. Although they are eerily reminiscent of the civil
However, terrorists could have some advantages over a legitimate state, in that they could obtain fissile material—most likely plutonium, which is produced by the nuclear industries of several countries—illegally, by theft, rather than attempting to purchase it openly or manufacture it. The construction of a traditional bomb itself requires sophisticated engineering and explosives expertise to get the explosive “lenses” that concentrate the impact correctly if plutonium is used—but it is conceivable that a well-funded terrorist group with access to the right expertise could manufacture a crude weapon.
Although plutonium is probably easier to get hold of illegally, the technical problems of making a bomb operate with it are significantly greater than with enriched uranium. Here, to quote nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez, “if highly enriched uranium is at hand it’s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion…. There would be a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material on the other…A high school child could make a bomb in short order.”
While Alvarez was probably exaggerating a little for effect, a bomb based on enriched uranium could easily be assembled in a garage laboratory. Of course this still leaves a terrorist group with the need to get its hands on enriched uranium. As the Manhattan Project and twenty-first-century examples like the Iranian nuclear program have proved, producing this is nontrivial. But enriched uranium exists in a number of countries around the world, some of them more open to black market deals than others—and its very existence makes it a potential target for theft.
However, the one disadvantage the terrorists have is that enriched uranium, unlike plutonium, which is a natural by-product of electricity-generating nuclear reactors, tends to be in the hands of the military. Uranium enrichment is a tricky, expensive, high-tech process, and there is no reason to have the substance unless you are building a weapon. The confinement of enriched uranium to military establishments does mean it is likely to be more securely stored than plutonium. But there is still the potential for terrorist access where military personnel are susceptible to bribes or threats.
On at least two occasions, quantities of around three kilograms of enriched uranium have been seized from individuals from the former Communist bloc who were attempting to smuggle the materials into the West. Remember that there is no other use for this material than for making a bomb, though it would require around sixty kilograms of highly enriched uranium to make a weapon. We have no idea how many such attempts to smuggle the material have got through undetected.
It seems to some analysts more likely that an existing bomb, from the arsenal of the former Soviet Union or from an area with complex politics like Pakistan, could fall into the hands of terrorists. This is a frightening possibility, though there are some safeguards. Most existing weapons, both U.S. and Soviet, have sophisticated mechanisms to avoid their being used by anyone other than their owners. It’s not impossible, but the probability is relatively low. Even so, the chance that terrorists could let off such a nuclear device is one that the U.S. government takes seriously.
In July 2009, the Committee on the Medical Preparedness for a Terrorist Nuclear Event, a group set up by the Institute of Medicine at the government’s request, held a workshop that produced a number of recommendations for coping with the impact of a nuclear blast. Although they are eerily reminiscent of the civil
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