their dealings with Pakistan as well as in their overall foreign policy. Nonetheless, I have always been convinced that the United States remains a force for good in the world. Pakistan has benefited from its relations with the United States and would benefit even more if it could overcome erroneous assumptions about its own national security and role in the world. Instead of seeking close security ties based on false promises, Pakistan must face its history and diversity honestly, and it should be neither dependent on nor resentful of the worldâs most powerful nation.
As Pakistanâs ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011, I sought to overcome the bitterness of the past in order to help lay the foundations for a long-term partnership. I studied the relationsbetween the United States and its other partners so as to figure out why almost all postâWorld War II US allies have found prosperity and stability through this partnership, whereas Pakistan has not. But major power centers in my own country resisted my vision of a broader US-Pakistan partnership rooted in mutual trust.
Instead of appreciating my efforts to redefine the US-Pakistan relationship through an honest appraisal of past mistakes, Pakistanâs security services saw me as working for American rather than Pakistani interests. Through the media I was falsely accused of helping the CIA expand its network of spies in Pakistan, and my remarks about the transactional nature of past ties were distorted so as to suggest that I had described Pakistanis as beggars. In the end I was forced to resign amid fabricated charges that I had sought help from the US military through a dubious American businessman of Pakistani origin in order to avert a coup.
But the willingness of my countrymen to believe the worst about their ambassador reflects a deeper pathology. Instead of basing international relations on facts, Pakistanis have become accustomed to seeing the world through the prism of an Islamo-nationalist ideology. Even well-traveled, erudite, and articulate Pakistani officials echo this ideology without realizing that holding tight to these self-defeating ideas makes little impact on the rest of the world; the gap is widening between how Pakistanis and the rest of the world view Pakistan.
Somehow, halfhearted and time-limited transactions rather than an honest dialog over shared interests seem to be the default pattern in US-Pakistan relations. For instance, as stated above, I found the two countries working toward very different outcomes in Afghanistan. I fear that the prospect of their alliance may end in acrimony once again.
The reemergence of democracy in Pakistan offers the hope that Pakistanis will someday be able to debate their national interests realistically and alter their national priorities so as to align more with those of the United States. If, however, the propaganda and the political strategies of the powerful Pakistani military continue to hold sway, alienation from the United States will remain inevitable. Additionally, Pakistanis are not likely to alter their priorities solely as partof a bargain involving aid and arms from the United States. Moreover, both countries are wrong when they assume that even as they act at cross-purposes, they will eventually succeed in persuading the other of their own respective points of view.
Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has debated its raison dâêtre. A vocal and powerful minority insists that the country was created to be an Islamic state, a semitheocracy governed by religious principles defined by those who support that vision. And in response to Pakistanâs insecurity toward India and the fear of this much larger neighbor culturally if not politically reabsorbing Pakistan, many otherwise modern, educated generals, judges, and politicians have embraced this Islamist paradigm.
Because of this, Pakistanâs short history as a nation has witnessed the demonization
As Pakistanâs ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011, I sought to overcome the bitterness of the past in order to help lay the foundations for a long-term partnership. I studied the relationsbetween the United States and its other partners so as to figure out why almost all postâWorld War II US allies have found prosperity and stability through this partnership, whereas Pakistan has not. But major power centers in my own country resisted my vision of a broader US-Pakistan partnership rooted in mutual trust.
Instead of appreciating my efforts to redefine the US-Pakistan relationship through an honest appraisal of past mistakes, Pakistanâs security services saw me as working for American rather than Pakistani interests. Through the media I was falsely accused of helping the CIA expand its network of spies in Pakistan, and my remarks about the transactional nature of past ties were distorted so as to suggest that I had described Pakistanis as beggars. In the end I was forced to resign amid fabricated charges that I had sought help from the US military through a dubious American businessman of Pakistani origin in order to avert a coup.
But the willingness of my countrymen to believe the worst about their ambassador reflects a deeper pathology. Instead of basing international relations on facts, Pakistanis have become accustomed to seeing the world through the prism of an Islamo-nationalist ideology. Even well-traveled, erudite, and articulate Pakistani officials echo this ideology without realizing that holding tight to these self-defeating ideas makes little impact on the rest of the world; the gap is widening between how Pakistanis and the rest of the world view Pakistan.
Somehow, halfhearted and time-limited transactions rather than an honest dialog over shared interests seem to be the default pattern in US-Pakistan relations. For instance, as stated above, I found the two countries working toward very different outcomes in Afghanistan. I fear that the prospect of their alliance may end in acrimony once again.
The reemergence of democracy in Pakistan offers the hope that Pakistanis will someday be able to debate their national interests realistically and alter their national priorities so as to align more with those of the United States. If, however, the propaganda and the political strategies of the powerful Pakistani military continue to hold sway, alienation from the United States will remain inevitable. Additionally, Pakistanis are not likely to alter their priorities solely as partof a bargain involving aid and arms from the United States. Moreover, both countries are wrong when they assume that even as they act at cross-purposes, they will eventually succeed in persuading the other of their own respective points of view.
Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has debated its raison dâêtre. A vocal and powerful minority insists that the country was created to be an Islamic state, a semitheocracy governed by religious principles defined by those who support that vision. And in response to Pakistanâs insecurity toward India and the fear of this much larger neighbor culturally if not politically reabsorbing Pakistan, many otherwise modern, educated generals, judges, and politicians have embraced this Islamist paradigm.
Because of this, Pakistanâs short history as a nation has witnessed the demonization
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