him. What passed at their meeting was not recorded in detail. But it is evident that Cowgill left under the impression that it was to his interest to prove the spurious nature of Dulles’s documents. It is also clear that he never studied the documents, then or thereafter. He was too busy and too tired. It was office politics that prompted him to play Dansey’s game. His estrangement from Vivian was almost complete. His relations with the Chief, though still reasonably good, were not clearly so close as he would have wished. But Dansey’s were very close indeed. By doing Dansey a good turn, by proving that Dulles had been sold a pup, he could also do himself a power of good.
Such was the picture that emerged from the messy Dansey-Cowgill correspondence. It made me think hard. About this time, a project was forming in my mind which needed a cautious approach. I was very anxious to get a certain job that would soon become available, and I could not afford to antagonize any of the people who might help me towards it. Cowgill, Vivian, Dansey, MI5, the Foreign Office, the Chief—they were all pieces of the jigsaw, and it was exceedingly difficult, from my comparatively lowly position, to see how they would fit together when the moment came for action on my part. I had, however, long since reached the conclusion that, although political manoeuvre can produce quick results, those results are lasting only if they are based on solid and conscientious work. I therefore decided to study the Dulles material on its merits. If it was unequivocally genuine or spurious, I would say so. If theoutcome of my study was inconclusive, I would then reconsider the political aspects of the affair before deciding on which side to throw my own weight.
The great majority of the documents purported to be telegrams received by the German Foreign Office from its missions abroad. The obvious first step was to check with our cryptographic experts whether they had already received intercepted messages matching the Dulles material. There was no evidence in the file that this elementary step had been taken; Dansey and Cowgill had contented themselves with skimming the papers cursorily in the search for implausibilities and contradictions to buttress their advocacy of the plant theory. I remember Cowgill’s instructions to keep in close contact with Dansey, and debated whether to consult him on the desirability of approaching the cryptographers. I was against it, as I thought that he would probably oppose the suggestion. When I found on rechecking the file that Dansey had minuted to Cowgill: “Passed to you for any action you may think necessary,” I decided that I was well enough covered to go ahead on my own.
By that time, the Government Code & Cypher School, our cryptographic organization, had been virtually split into two departments. One, under Commander Travis, * dealt with all service traffic; the other, under Commander Denniston, † handled diplomatic messages. As the Dulles material was German Foreign Office correspondence, Denniston was my man. I chose for his scrutiny a striking series of telegrams from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo to the German General Staff which had been transmitted through diplomatic channels. They contained detailed statements of the Japanese Order of Battle and assessments of future Japanese intentions. There were about a dozen in all and, if genuine, they were clearly of the highest importance.
Two days later, Denniston telephoned me in a state of some excitement. He told me that three of my telegrams exactly matched intercepted telegrams which they had already deciphered, and that the others were proving of the utmost value to his cryptographers in their breakdown of the German diplomatic code. Could I get him some more? I could indeed, and began to feed the stuff to Denniston as fast as he could absorb it. When about a third of the material had passed through his hands with a steadily increasing tally of
Such was the picture that emerged from the messy Dansey-Cowgill correspondence. It made me think hard. About this time, a project was forming in my mind which needed a cautious approach. I was very anxious to get a certain job that would soon become available, and I could not afford to antagonize any of the people who might help me towards it. Cowgill, Vivian, Dansey, MI5, the Foreign Office, the Chief—they were all pieces of the jigsaw, and it was exceedingly difficult, from my comparatively lowly position, to see how they would fit together when the moment came for action on my part. I had, however, long since reached the conclusion that, although political manoeuvre can produce quick results, those results are lasting only if they are based on solid and conscientious work. I therefore decided to study the Dulles material on its merits. If it was unequivocally genuine or spurious, I would say so. If theoutcome of my study was inconclusive, I would then reconsider the political aspects of the affair before deciding on which side to throw my own weight.
The great majority of the documents purported to be telegrams received by the German Foreign Office from its missions abroad. The obvious first step was to check with our cryptographic experts whether they had already received intercepted messages matching the Dulles material. There was no evidence in the file that this elementary step had been taken; Dansey and Cowgill had contented themselves with skimming the papers cursorily in the search for implausibilities and contradictions to buttress their advocacy of the plant theory. I remember Cowgill’s instructions to keep in close contact with Dansey, and debated whether to consult him on the desirability of approaching the cryptographers. I was against it, as I thought that he would probably oppose the suggestion. When I found on rechecking the file that Dansey had minuted to Cowgill: “Passed to you for any action you may think necessary,” I decided that I was well enough covered to go ahead on my own.
By that time, the Government Code & Cypher School, our cryptographic organization, had been virtually split into two departments. One, under Commander Travis, * dealt with all service traffic; the other, under Commander Denniston, † handled diplomatic messages. As the Dulles material was German Foreign Office correspondence, Denniston was my man. I chose for his scrutiny a striking series of telegrams from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo to the German General Staff which had been transmitted through diplomatic channels. They contained detailed statements of the Japanese Order of Battle and assessments of future Japanese intentions. There were about a dozen in all and, if genuine, they were clearly of the highest importance.
Two days later, Denniston telephoned me in a state of some excitement. He told me that three of my telegrams exactly matched intercepted telegrams which they had already deciphered, and that the others were proving of the utmost value to his cryptographers in their breakdown of the German diplomatic code. Could I get him some more? I could indeed, and began to feed the stuff to Denniston as fast as he could absorb it. When about a third of the material had passed through his hands with a steadily increasing tally of
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