heating up, Moore needed to get his movie into theaters. Although Weinstein had told Eisner and Murphy that he planned to sell the film’s distribution rights after it was screened at the Cannes Film Festival, Moore had a more expedient stratagem. On the
Fahrenheit 9/11
DVD, Moore says he resolved to get the film seen in America “by hook or by crook.” His hook was censorship.
On May 5, 2004, the
New York Times
ran a front-page article headlined “Disney Is Blocking Distribution of Film That Criticizes Bush.” The story included the sensational charge that Eisner “expressed particular concern that [choosing to distribute
Fahrenheit 9/11]
would endanger tax breaks Disney receives for its theme park, hotels, and other ventures in Florida, where Mr. Bush’s brother, Jeb, is governor.” The source for this allegationwas Moore’s agent, Ari Emanuel. Two days later, Moore claimed on his Web site that Disney’s board of directors rejected
Fahrenheit 9/11
“last week.” In fact, the Disney board had not made such a decision in 2004; the project had been vetoed in 2003.
Moore’s excursion from reality proved a boon at Cannes. On May 22, 2004, the Cannes jury defied putative efforts to censor Moore by awarding
Fahrenheit 9/11
the prestigious Palme d’Or. Moore now had a golden palm in his hand and the media at his feet. With more free publicity than any Hollywood studio could afford to buy,
Fahrenheit 9/11
now stood to rake in a fortune. And Disney, which still controlled the movie’s rights through its subsidiary Miramax, now got to decide who was going to profit from it. Disney had some experience dealing with Miramax’s hot potatoes. Rather than distributing the controversial
Kids
and
Dogma
, Disney allowed Miramax founders Harvey and Bob Weinstein to buy the films back and set up short-lived companies to distribute them. But those potatoes were as small as they were hot. In the case of
Fahrenheit 9/11
, Eisner wasn’t about to let the windfall escape into the Weinstein brothers’ pockets. Nor could Disney take the PR hit that would result from backtracking and distributing the movie itself.
Eisner’s solution: Generate the illusion of outside distribution while orchestrating a deal that allowed Disney to reap most of the profits. Here’s how the dazzling deal worked. On paper, the Weinstein brothers bought the rights to
Fahrenheit 9/11
from Miramax. The Weinsteins then transferred the rights to a Disney corporate front called Fellowship Adventure Group. In turn, that company outsourced the documentary’s theatrical distribution rights (principally to Lions Gate Films, IFC Films, and Alliance Atlantis Vivafilms) and video distribution rights (to Columbia Tristar Home Entertainment).
Because of the buzz now attached to
Fahrenheit 9/11
, Harvey Weinstein extracted extremely favorable terms from these distributors, about one-third of what distributors typically charge. Their cut amounted to slightly more than 12 percent of the total they collected from the theaters. As a result,
Fahrenheit 9/11’s
net receipts, what remains after the distributors deduct their percentage and their out-of-pocket expenses (mounting an ad campaign, making prints, dubbing the film), would be much higher than those of a typical Hollywood film.
Fahrenheit 9/11
, now an event, took in more than $228 million in ticket sales worldwide, a record for a documentary, and sold 3 million DVDs,which brought in another $30 million in royalties. After the theaters took their share of the movie’s gross (roughly 50 percent) and distributors deducted the marketing expenses (including prints, advertising, dubbing, and custom clearance) and took their own cut, the net receipts returned to Disney were $78 million.
Disney now had to pay Michael Moore’s profit participation. Under normal circumstances, documentaries rarely, if ever, make profits (especially if distributors charge the usual 33 percent fee). So, when Miramax made the deal
Fahrenheit 9/11
DVD, Moore says he resolved to get the film seen in America “by hook or by crook.” His hook was censorship.
On May 5, 2004, the
New York Times
ran a front-page article headlined “Disney Is Blocking Distribution of Film That Criticizes Bush.” The story included the sensational charge that Eisner “expressed particular concern that [choosing to distribute
Fahrenheit 9/11]
would endanger tax breaks Disney receives for its theme park, hotels, and other ventures in Florida, where Mr. Bush’s brother, Jeb, is governor.” The source for this allegationwas Moore’s agent, Ari Emanuel. Two days later, Moore claimed on his Web site that Disney’s board of directors rejected
Fahrenheit 9/11
“last week.” In fact, the Disney board had not made such a decision in 2004; the project had been vetoed in 2003.
Moore’s excursion from reality proved a boon at Cannes. On May 22, 2004, the Cannes jury defied putative efforts to censor Moore by awarding
Fahrenheit 9/11
the prestigious Palme d’Or. Moore now had a golden palm in his hand and the media at his feet. With more free publicity than any Hollywood studio could afford to buy,
Fahrenheit 9/11
now stood to rake in a fortune. And Disney, which still controlled the movie’s rights through its subsidiary Miramax, now got to decide who was going to profit from it. Disney had some experience dealing with Miramax’s hot potatoes. Rather than distributing the controversial
Kids
and
Dogma
, Disney allowed Miramax founders Harvey and Bob Weinstein to buy the films back and set up short-lived companies to distribute them. But those potatoes were as small as they were hot. In the case of
Fahrenheit 9/11
, Eisner wasn’t about to let the windfall escape into the Weinstein brothers’ pockets. Nor could Disney take the PR hit that would result from backtracking and distributing the movie itself.
Eisner’s solution: Generate the illusion of outside distribution while orchestrating a deal that allowed Disney to reap most of the profits. Here’s how the dazzling deal worked. On paper, the Weinstein brothers bought the rights to
Fahrenheit 9/11
from Miramax. The Weinsteins then transferred the rights to a Disney corporate front called Fellowship Adventure Group. In turn, that company outsourced the documentary’s theatrical distribution rights (principally to Lions Gate Films, IFC Films, and Alliance Atlantis Vivafilms) and video distribution rights (to Columbia Tristar Home Entertainment).
Because of the buzz now attached to
Fahrenheit 9/11
, Harvey Weinstein extracted extremely favorable terms from these distributors, about one-third of what distributors typically charge. Their cut amounted to slightly more than 12 percent of the total they collected from the theaters. As a result,
Fahrenheit 9/11’s
net receipts, what remains after the distributors deduct their percentage and their out-of-pocket expenses (mounting an ad campaign, making prints, dubbing the film), would be much higher than those of a typical Hollywood film.
Fahrenheit 9/11
, now an event, took in more than $228 million in ticket sales worldwide, a record for a documentary, and sold 3 million DVDs,which brought in another $30 million in royalties. After the theaters took their share of the movie’s gross (roughly 50 percent) and distributors deducted the marketing expenses (including prints, advertising, dubbing, and custom clearance) and took their own cut, the net receipts returned to Disney were $78 million.
Disney now had to pay Michael Moore’s profit participation. Under normal circumstances, documentaries rarely, if ever, make profits (especially if distributors charge the usual 33 percent fee). So, when Miramax made the deal
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