patron-client relations. This largely reinforced and hardened pre-existing patronage networks, and in some instances it replaced them.
In 1978–92, Pushtuns dominated one of Afghanistan’s twoCommunist parties and six of the seven Peshawar-based Sunni resistance parties (with the others dominated by Dari-speakers but including substantial Pushtun membership), creating organizations in Afghanistan that cut across tribal lines. The Hezb-e-Islami (HiH) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a detribalized Pushtun from Kunduz) became the most powerful of the six Peshawar-based Pushtun parties in 1978–92. It had the highest priority for Pakistani aid and a strong top-down organization. HiH was able to overcome many of the divisions inherent in tribal and religious networks in the other parties. Hekmatyar himself perceived the party as adapting the tactics of a Leninist “vanguard part” to Islamism.
In 1978–92, Pakistan backed only a single Sunni predominantly Dari-speaking major resistance party among the “Peshawar Seven,” Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan (JIA). This brought together the disparate Tadji geographical groups—Panjsheris, Heratis, Badakshis, and others. JIA’s Islamist ideology had to extend to both traditional and revolutionary politics and religious orientation among Dari-speakers because there were no separate parties for them, unlike the Pushtuns. 30 Ahmad Shah Massoud, who started as the charismatic leader of anti-Soviet resistance in his native Panjshir Valley in 1978 (he had previously led a Pakistani-funded revolt there against Kabul in 1975), was in later years able to use the JIA to help build what became the Northern Alliance. 31
The Taliban of 1994–2001 lacked an effective party organization but continued the party-originated move toward militarization as they attempted to politicize and, more lastingly, ethnically unify Pushtun Afghanistan and lead it in civil war against their opponents.
Post-2001 Afghan political parties were largely identified with the ethnolinguistic and ideological polarization associated with the decades of conflict. This contributed to the 2004 decision by Hamid Karzai—over international objections—to employ an electoral system intended to marginalize political parties in parliamentary elections. However, once the parliament was operating, parties proliferated; by 2008, there were 104 registered. But none has emerged as a viable, strong force, whether independently or as part of a recognizable coalition. “Afghanistan politics are very personalized; institution buildinghas been taken hostage by personalities,” in the words of Ambassador Mahmoud Saikal. 32
In 2008–10, there were political parties on both sides of Afghanistan’s conflicts. The post-2001 Taliban has moved away from the party model of organization. HiH remains a part of the insurgent coalition, although Hekmatyar’s model has reportedly shifted to that of the Lebanese Hezbollah, embracing armed struggle while not ruling out political participation.
In the absence of effective state authority in much of Afghanistan, “warlords,” who combined both local authority and armed force without the check of being part of a legitimate state structure and had emerged from the 1978–2001 conflicts, were important post-2001. Warlords are not a traditional Afghan institution. There is no agreement as to who are warlords. Ahmad Shah Massoud, the defense minister and de facto military leader of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the mujahideen-based regime that tried to rule from Kabul in 1992–96 and was assassinated by Al Qaeda immediately before the 9/11 attack in 2001, was characterized as a warlord by many (especially Pushtuns), but in death he has become the national hero of post-2001 Afghanistan.
The absence of effective governance at the grassroots level post-2001 has ensured that warlords remain a part of Afghanistan’s institutions. In much of Afghanistan, leadership figures from the 1978–2001 conflicts
In 1978–92, Pushtuns dominated one of Afghanistan’s twoCommunist parties and six of the seven Peshawar-based Sunni resistance parties (with the others dominated by Dari-speakers but including substantial Pushtun membership), creating organizations in Afghanistan that cut across tribal lines. The Hezb-e-Islami (HiH) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a detribalized Pushtun from Kunduz) became the most powerful of the six Peshawar-based Pushtun parties in 1978–92. It had the highest priority for Pakistani aid and a strong top-down organization. HiH was able to overcome many of the divisions inherent in tribal and religious networks in the other parties. Hekmatyar himself perceived the party as adapting the tactics of a Leninist “vanguard part” to Islamism.
In 1978–92, Pakistan backed only a single Sunni predominantly Dari-speaking major resistance party among the “Peshawar Seven,” Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan (JIA). This brought together the disparate Tadji geographical groups—Panjsheris, Heratis, Badakshis, and others. JIA’s Islamist ideology had to extend to both traditional and revolutionary politics and religious orientation among Dari-speakers because there were no separate parties for them, unlike the Pushtuns. 30 Ahmad Shah Massoud, who started as the charismatic leader of anti-Soviet resistance in his native Panjshir Valley in 1978 (he had previously led a Pakistani-funded revolt there against Kabul in 1975), was in later years able to use the JIA to help build what became the Northern Alliance. 31
The Taliban of 1994–2001 lacked an effective party organization but continued the party-originated move toward militarization as they attempted to politicize and, more lastingly, ethnically unify Pushtun Afghanistan and lead it in civil war against their opponents.
Post-2001 Afghan political parties were largely identified with the ethnolinguistic and ideological polarization associated with the decades of conflict. This contributed to the 2004 decision by Hamid Karzai—over international objections—to employ an electoral system intended to marginalize political parties in parliamentary elections. However, once the parliament was operating, parties proliferated; by 2008, there were 104 registered. But none has emerged as a viable, strong force, whether independently or as part of a recognizable coalition. “Afghanistan politics are very personalized; institution buildinghas been taken hostage by personalities,” in the words of Ambassador Mahmoud Saikal. 32
In 2008–10, there were political parties on both sides of Afghanistan’s conflicts. The post-2001 Taliban has moved away from the party model of organization. HiH remains a part of the insurgent coalition, although Hekmatyar’s model has reportedly shifted to that of the Lebanese Hezbollah, embracing armed struggle while not ruling out political participation.
In the absence of effective state authority in much of Afghanistan, “warlords,” who combined both local authority and armed force without the check of being part of a legitimate state structure and had emerged from the 1978–2001 conflicts, were important post-2001. Warlords are not a traditional Afghan institution. There is no agreement as to who are warlords. Ahmad Shah Massoud, the defense minister and de facto military leader of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the mujahideen-based regime that tried to rule from Kabul in 1992–96 and was assassinated by Al Qaeda immediately before the 9/11 attack in 2001, was characterized as a warlord by many (especially Pushtuns), but in death he has become the national hero of post-2001 Afghanistan.
The absence of effective governance at the grassroots level post-2001 has ensured that warlords remain a part of Afghanistan’s institutions. In much of Afghanistan, leadership figures from the 1978–2001 conflicts
Similar Books
