very isolated. He asked if we thought the Cubans really would withdraw from Angola. I said that their withdrawal so far was aheadof schedule. He made a half-hearted attempt to complain about the Americans, but did not have the energy to finish it. He said that he would be handing over his seals of office in September.
I doubted that he would agree to go gracefully, but felt a sense of great relief and satisfaction at seeing the last of him. For this was a man who never should have been put in charge of the fortunes of his or any other country. For he it was who had personally authorised one of his physicians, Dr Wouter Basson, to develop chemical and biological weapons for use against enemies of the regime.
June 1989
The next step was to arrange for De Klerk to visit Mrs Thatcher at Chequers. This was still an unpopular thing to do; we were accused of colluding with the apartheid regime and the meeting was picketed by the Anti-Apartheid Movement. In fact, Mrs Thatcher made clear to De Klerk, with her customary lack of ambiguity, the need to get on with the Namibia settlement and to release Mandela. She found De Klerk open-minded and a refreshing contrast to PW Botha, but his replies enigmatic. As we stood on the steps at Chequers watching De Klerkâs motorcade depart, she told me that she still was uncertain how far he would be prepared to go. I told her that I believed De Klerk would go further than she imagined.
The National Party programme for the elections, however, was a cautious document. The remaining apartheid laws would be eased, or simply not enforced, rather than abolished. The talk of a new constitution was understandably vague. De Klerk had been similarly cautious in a meeting with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn.
There were still many who doubted whether De Klerkâs reformist language was anything more than a change of style. His brother, Wimpie, who was playing a leading role in the private discussions with the ANC, told me he feared that his brother was far too conservative to be a good president. I said that he knew his brother better than I did, but I thought FW de Klerk would prove him wrong.
Notes
15 David Welsh,
The Rise and Fall of Apartheid
, Jonathan Ball, 2009, p. 384.
CHAPTER IX
âYou can tell your Prime Minister she will not be disappointedâ
In spite of De Klerkâs successful meetings with the Prime Minister and Chancellor Kohl at the end of June 1989, President George Bush felt unable to invite him to Washington, for fear of difficulties with Congress. The US official responsible for Africa, Hank Cohen, protested in vain that âit would be a mistake to deal ourselves out of the gameâ just when it was becoming more interesting. 16
5 July 1989
PW Botha invited Nelson Mandela to tea with him in his office in the Tuynhuys. Mandelaâs warder helped him to knot his tie: he had not had much use for one in prison. Niel Barnard, head of the NIS, knelt down to tie Mandelaâs shoelaces. PW Botha greeted him courteously. Coetsee and Barnard had advised Mandela to avoid raising contentious issues with the President. So they talked about South African history. The meeting lasted less than half an hour. At the end, Mandelaasked Botha to release all political prisoners. Botha said that he could not do that. 17
Mandela was generous about this meeting in his memoirs. What it really amounted to was an attempt by PW Botha to upstage De Klerk and to show that, politically, he was not dead yet. As I pointed out at the time, however, the meeting was going to make it impossible in future to criticise contacts with the ANC.
12 July 1989
In London, Archbishop Trevor Huddleston asked if the Prime Minister would meet Albertina Sisulu, a request strongly supported by me. She had suffered more than most at the hands of the regime, having been detained and banned herself, as well as having had her husband imprisoned for the past twenty-six years. She was held in considerably higher esteem
I doubted that he would agree to go gracefully, but felt a sense of great relief and satisfaction at seeing the last of him. For this was a man who never should have been put in charge of the fortunes of his or any other country. For he it was who had personally authorised one of his physicians, Dr Wouter Basson, to develop chemical and biological weapons for use against enemies of the regime.
June 1989
The next step was to arrange for De Klerk to visit Mrs Thatcher at Chequers. This was still an unpopular thing to do; we were accused of colluding with the apartheid regime and the meeting was picketed by the Anti-Apartheid Movement. In fact, Mrs Thatcher made clear to De Klerk, with her customary lack of ambiguity, the need to get on with the Namibia settlement and to release Mandela. She found De Klerk open-minded and a refreshing contrast to PW Botha, but his replies enigmatic. As we stood on the steps at Chequers watching De Klerkâs motorcade depart, she told me that she still was uncertain how far he would be prepared to go. I told her that I believed De Klerk would go further than she imagined.
The National Party programme for the elections, however, was a cautious document. The remaining apartheid laws would be eased, or simply not enforced, rather than abolished. The talk of a new constitution was understandably vague. De Klerk had been similarly cautious in a meeting with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn.
There were still many who doubted whether De Klerkâs reformist language was anything more than a change of style. His brother, Wimpie, who was playing a leading role in the private discussions with the ANC, told me he feared that his brother was far too conservative to be a good president. I said that he knew his brother better than I did, but I thought FW de Klerk would prove him wrong.
Notes
15 David Welsh,
The Rise and Fall of Apartheid
, Jonathan Ball, 2009, p. 384.
CHAPTER IX
âYou can tell your Prime Minister she will not be disappointedâ
In spite of De Klerkâs successful meetings with the Prime Minister and Chancellor Kohl at the end of June 1989, President George Bush felt unable to invite him to Washington, for fear of difficulties with Congress. The US official responsible for Africa, Hank Cohen, protested in vain that âit would be a mistake to deal ourselves out of the gameâ just when it was becoming more interesting. 16
5 July 1989
PW Botha invited Nelson Mandela to tea with him in his office in the Tuynhuys. Mandelaâs warder helped him to knot his tie: he had not had much use for one in prison. Niel Barnard, head of the NIS, knelt down to tie Mandelaâs shoelaces. PW Botha greeted him courteously. Coetsee and Barnard had advised Mandela to avoid raising contentious issues with the President. So they talked about South African history. The meeting lasted less than half an hour. At the end, Mandelaasked Botha to release all political prisoners. Botha said that he could not do that. 17
Mandela was generous about this meeting in his memoirs. What it really amounted to was an attempt by PW Botha to upstage De Klerk and to show that, politically, he was not dead yet. As I pointed out at the time, however, the meeting was going to make it impossible in future to criticise contacts with the ANC.
12 July 1989
In London, Archbishop Trevor Huddleston asked if the Prime Minister would meet Albertina Sisulu, a request strongly supported by me. She had suffered more than most at the hands of the regime, having been detained and banned herself, as well as having had her husband imprisoned for the past twenty-six years. She was held in considerably higher esteem
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