chance to change the course of events after the elections. The opportunity must not be lost. Du Plessis, like his colleagues, including De Klerk, was thinking in terms of power-sharing and certainly not of a transfer of power. As he talked of trying to make progress with Buthelezi, I asked the Prime Minister to make clear to him the imperative need to release Mandela, which she proceeded to do.
2 May 1989
I was asked to extract from the South African government, that same day, a response to accusations, made during the trial in Paris of a US arms dealer and three other accused, that South African agents had supplied a rocket launcher and training to a Northern Ireland Protestant paramilitary splinter group. This produced an untypically contrite letter from PW Botha denying that the South Africans had supplied a rocket launcher (it had come from a middleman), but acknowledging that two members of the group had received training in the use of a rocket launcher in South Africa in 1988. Margaret Thatcher replied that the South African ambassador was being askedto send home three members of his staff. The South African arms procurement agency, Armscor, must be told to cease their activities in the United Kingdom.
3 May 1989
FW de Klerk told me that the election would be held on 3 September. He hoped to see the Prime Minister in June. I said that we were concerned about the activities of the lunatic fringes of the security establishment, as evidenced in the missile story from Paris. South Africa could not afford to keep shooting itself in the foot in this way. I warned about military intelligence units âtaking outâ enemies of the regime, and that, despite his own orders to terminate support for Renamo, senior officers in military intelligence were continuing arms supplies to them. De Klerk said that any South African president had to retain the support of the armed forces and the police. But he was determined to assert civilian control over the military. I said that we welcomed his statement that after the elections there would have to be negotiations on a new constitution.
In a joint meeting with De Klerk at this time, Harry Oppenheimer and Jan Steyn told me that they too had warned him of the difficulty of knowing exactly what shadowy and criminal elements of the security forces were doing in defiance of any authority from the President.
10 May 1989
In a further discussion with him, De Klerk told me that he envisaged a new constitutional body that would be above the existing houses of parliament. The homelands would become part of a federation.I observed that Buthelezi had made clear that he would not participate unless Mandela were released. What kind of offer would be made to the extra-parliamentary opposition?
De Klerk had not worked out an answer to this question. He was preoccupied with the need to defeat Andries Treurnicht and the Conservative Party in the elections, in which he would be facing a strong right-wing challenge in his own constituency of Vereeniging.
18 May 1989
Helen Suzman had a good relationship with FW de Klerk, whom she had always found to be meticulous and courteous in his dealings with her, despite their political differences. She told him in parliament that his statement of intent must be translated into reality. She saw him not as a starry-eyed liberal, but as a pragmatic, intelligent man who understood what needed to be done to secure the countryâs future. He had not previously had the authority to be able to do so. She quoted the African saying about not arguing with the crocodile when you are still in the water â an unmistakable reference to PW Botha. But now, she said, De Klerk was no longer in the water and could do what needed to be done to restore peace at home and South Africaâs reputation abroad. Above all, he must use his powers to prevent all further offensive actions by the state.
6 June 1989
I called on PW Botha, who was looking tired and fragile, and was now
2 May 1989
I was asked to extract from the South African government, that same day, a response to accusations, made during the trial in Paris of a US arms dealer and three other accused, that South African agents had supplied a rocket launcher and training to a Northern Ireland Protestant paramilitary splinter group. This produced an untypically contrite letter from PW Botha denying that the South Africans had supplied a rocket launcher (it had come from a middleman), but acknowledging that two members of the group had received training in the use of a rocket launcher in South Africa in 1988. Margaret Thatcher replied that the South African ambassador was being askedto send home three members of his staff. The South African arms procurement agency, Armscor, must be told to cease their activities in the United Kingdom.
3 May 1989
FW de Klerk told me that the election would be held on 3 September. He hoped to see the Prime Minister in June. I said that we were concerned about the activities of the lunatic fringes of the security establishment, as evidenced in the missile story from Paris. South Africa could not afford to keep shooting itself in the foot in this way. I warned about military intelligence units âtaking outâ enemies of the regime, and that, despite his own orders to terminate support for Renamo, senior officers in military intelligence were continuing arms supplies to them. De Klerk said that any South African president had to retain the support of the armed forces and the police. But he was determined to assert civilian control over the military. I said that we welcomed his statement that after the elections there would have to be negotiations on a new constitution.
In a joint meeting with De Klerk at this time, Harry Oppenheimer and Jan Steyn told me that they too had warned him of the difficulty of knowing exactly what shadowy and criminal elements of the security forces were doing in defiance of any authority from the President.
10 May 1989
In a further discussion with him, De Klerk told me that he envisaged a new constitutional body that would be above the existing houses of parliament. The homelands would become part of a federation.I observed that Buthelezi had made clear that he would not participate unless Mandela were released. What kind of offer would be made to the extra-parliamentary opposition?
De Klerk had not worked out an answer to this question. He was preoccupied with the need to defeat Andries Treurnicht and the Conservative Party in the elections, in which he would be facing a strong right-wing challenge in his own constituency of Vereeniging.
18 May 1989
Helen Suzman had a good relationship with FW de Klerk, whom she had always found to be meticulous and courteous in his dealings with her, despite their political differences. She told him in parliament that his statement of intent must be translated into reality. She saw him not as a starry-eyed liberal, but as a pragmatic, intelligent man who understood what needed to be done to secure the countryâs future. He had not previously had the authority to be able to do so. She quoted the African saying about not arguing with the crocodile when you are still in the water â an unmistakable reference to PW Botha. But now, she said, De Klerk was no longer in the water and could do what needed to be done to restore peace at home and South Africaâs reputation abroad. Above all, he must use his powers to prevent all further offensive actions by the state.
6 June 1989
I called on PW Botha, who was looking tired and fragile, and was now
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