intimated that the decision emanated from Downing Street and could not be gainsaid. Freyberg, loyal and naturally chivalrous, could do no other than accept. Possibly, even at the outset, he felt his command to be a poisoned chalice.
The situation on the island was far from propitious. Since the British presence had first been established in late 1940 no clear vision for the defence had been realised. It was a case of âmuddling throughâ and this lack of strategic overview and the absence of a coherent plan was palpably obvious.
SOE had sent Peter Wilkinson to observe the state of preparedness and his conclusions were far from encouraging. He reported on a state of âcomplete inertiaâ â a total lack of âelementary precautionsâ. He commented, tellingly, on the lack of any decent north/south road, despite the fact that there was only some four miles left to complete and the garrison had had six months in which do the job.
That the lack of a major arterial road to the south coast was a considerable weakness, was scarcely a revelation. The Axisâs success in Greece had placed the great harbours of the north coast within reach of the German bombers. For any re-supply to be effected from Egypt by sea would expose the British ships to the gauntlet of air attack, at a time when the RAF was so seriously depleted. Souda Bay had become a maritime graveyard with over 50,000 tons of Allied shipping already lost. Even with the inestimable boon of hindsight it is possible to see that had Sphakia been turned into a viable small supply harbour, with the steep mountain road to Askifou completed to a reasonable standard, the risk to the ships would have been considerably diminished.
Most disturbing was the lack of air cover. An observer wrote of the doomed flight of the final Hurricane to take off from Maleme, instantly swallowed by a horde of marauding Messerschmitts. Desperate as the odds were the situation had been considerably exacerbated by the poor siting of AA batteries and the failure to construct fighter pens and smaller, satellite airstrips under the sheltering lee of the high hills.
In his report Wilkinson did not spare the Air Force: â...the attitude of the RAF beggars descriptionâ. Unconvinced by âexcusesâ, he draws a most unfavourable comparison with the Luftwaffe, citing their apparent ability to carve out temporary airfields within hours of their arrival. Most tellingly he points out that, whilst prior to the Greek debacle Crete may have been an inconsequential backwater, the evacuation from the mainland put the island in the strategic forefront. Lastly Wilkinson castigated the Navy for the poor state of preparation at Souda Bay, citing the lack of any foam firefighting apparatus.
Upon assessing the burden of his command, Freyberg sent an urgent signal to Wavell wherein he complained the force he had available was inadequate and that he needed support both at sea and from the air. He pointed out that much of his troopsâ heavy equipment, particularly artillery, had been abandoned in the course of the Greek fiasco. Even entrenching tools were in pitifully short supply, as indeed was just about everything else. At the same time he wrote in a very similar vein to the home government.
The C.-in-C., having conferred with Admiral Cunningham, responded in a positive tone, giving assurance that the Navy would not let the defenders down â this was in spite of the Admiralâs misgivings that, at such short notice, the island could be evacuated. Wavell, throughout, was not convinced of German intentions by sea. Neither he nor Cunningham believed the Axis could amass sufficient vessels for such an undertaking.
Churchill, in London, also perceived the greatest threat lay more toward the skies than the clear, blue waters of the Mediterranean. When the Prime Minister wrote to his counterpart in New Zealand he emphasised the nature of the airborne threat, at the same
The situation on the island was far from propitious. Since the British presence had first been established in late 1940 no clear vision for the defence had been realised. It was a case of âmuddling throughâ and this lack of strategic overview and the absence of a coherent plan was palpably obvious.
SOE had sent Peter Wilkinson to observe the state of preparedness and his conclusions were far from encouraging. He reported on a state of âcomplete inertiaâ â a total lack of âelementary precautionsâ. He commented, tellingly, on the lack of any decent north/south road, despite the fact that there was only some four miles left to complete and the garrison had had six months in which do the job.
That the lack of a major arterial road to the south coast was a considerable weakness, was scarcely a revelation. The Axisâs success in Greece had placed the great harbours of the north coast within reach of the German bombers. For any re-supply to be effected from Egypt by sea would expose the British ships to the gauntlet of air attack, at a time when the RAF was so seriously depleted. Souda Bay had become a maritime graveyard with over 50,000 tons of Allied shipping already lost. Even with the inestimable boon of hindsight it is possible to see that had Sphakia been turned into a viable small supply harbour, with the steep mountain road to Askifou completed to a reasonable standard, the risk to the ships would have been considerably diminished.
Most disturbing was the lack of air cover. An observer wrote of the doomed flight of the final Hurricane to take off from Maleme, instantly swallowed by a horde of marauding Messerschmitts. Desperate as the odds were the situation had been considerably exacerbated by the poor siting of AA batteries and the failure to construct fighter pens and smaller, satellite airstrips under the sheltering lee of the high hills.
In his report Wilkinson did not spare the Air Force: â...the attitude of the RAF beggars descriptionâ. Unconvinced by âexcusesâ, he draws a most unfavourable comparison with the Luftwaffe, citing their apparent ability to carve out temporary airfields within hours of their arrival. Most tellingly he points out that, whilst prior to the Greek debacle Crete may have been an inconsequential backwater, the evacuation from the mainland put the island in the strategic forefront. Lastly Wilkinson castigated the Navy for the poor state of preparation at Souda Bay, citing the lack of any foam firefighting apparatus.
Upon assessing the burden of his command, Freyberg sent an urgent signal to Wavell wherein he complained the force he had available was inadequate and that he needed support both at sea and from the air. He pointed out that much of his troopsâ heavy equipment, particularly artillery, had been abandoned in the course of the Greek fiasco. Even entrenching tools were in pitifully short supply, as indeed was just about everything else. At the same time he wrote in a very similar vein to the home government.
The C.-in-C., having conferred with Admiral Cunningham, responded in a positive tone, giving assurance that the Navy would not let the defenders down â this was in spite of the Admiralâs misgivings that, at such short notice, the island could be evacuated. Wavell, throughout, was not convinced of German intentions by sea. Neither he nor Cunningham believed the Axis could amass sufficient vessels for such an undertaking.
Churchill, in London, also perceived the greatest threat lay more toward the skies than the clear, blue waters of the Mediterranean. When the Prime Minister wrote to his counterpart in New Zealand he emphasised the nature of the airborne threat, at the same
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