facilities for dispersal, would offer a tempting target for the Luftwaffe; likely a repeat of the experience on the mainland. Once the Axis had constructed its own strips in the Peloponnese the island would be in range of the dreaded Me109s with their lethal capacity for low level strafing.
Blame for the eventual defeat was shunted onto Wavell, tidily ignoring the immense practical difficulties confronting GHQ Cairo and disregarding the natural obstacles created by the topography. To establish a viable route to the south coast (the road to Sphakia was incomplete) would have been a major engineering feat, impossible in the time available and, even if completed, suicidal for convoys in the face of German air power. It can also be said that it was the decision to engage the enemy on the mainland that diverted attention away from Crete. Had the concept of the island fortress been actioned at the start of 1941 then history might have taken a different course.
Greece had eaten into Wavellâs supplies, meagre at best, to an alarming degree:
The loss of men was ⦠mercifully lighter than it might have been: 2000 had been killed or wounded and 4000 made prisoner out of 58000 troops sent to Greece. But the loss of materiel was disastrous: 104 tanks, 40 anti aircraft guns, 193 field guns, 1812 machine guns, about 8000 transport vehicles, most of the signals equipment, inestimable quantities of stores and 209 aircraft⦠24
With the mainland lost Churchill moved the island up to a higher slot in the list of priorities â the question was whether to seek to hold Crete or withdraw all units to North Africa. The Prime Minister had no doubts:
Crete must be held [he instructed Wavell on 17 April] ⦠and you should provide for this in the re-distribution of your forces. It is important that strong elements of Greek Army should establish themselves in Crete, together with King and Government.. we shall aid and maintain defence of Crete to the utmost. 25
The decision was taken and he would not brook any contrary opinion; Cunningham was rebuked for expressing reservations. Wilson then sent his pessimistic but realistic assessment but the die was firmly cast. With ULTRA intelligence now playing a part, 26 Churchill launched fully into bulldog mode: âIt seems from our information that a heavy airborne attack by German troops and bombers will soon be made on Crete ⦠It ought to be a fine opportunity for killing parachute troops. The island must be stubbornly defended.â 27 Moreover, the PM knew just the man to exploit this heaven-sent opportunity for slaughtering the enemy.
General Bernard Freyberg was indeed a Herculean figure â physically imposing and utterly fearless, he had served with considerable distinction during the Great War and had won the Victoria Cross. Churchill regarded him with some reverence. Although born in New Zealand, most of his life and career had been in Britain. When the Prime Minister, meeting the General in the 1920s, begged him to âstrip his sleeve and show his scarsâ , he counted no less than twenty-seven old wounds.
It was to this officer, the doyen of fighting soldiers, that Wavell turned at the end of April. He had lost confidence in Wilson who clearly had little confidence of his ability to hold the island. Flying to Maleme on 30 April, the commander-in-chief interviewed Wilson and informed him of his decision to post him to the Levant. Having disposed of one commander he then spoke privately to Freyberg who was nearby. After congratulating the General on the performance of his Kiwis in Greece he dropped the apparent bombshell that Freyberg was now to command in Crete.
Perhaps any general, on being entrusted with so difficult an enterprise, would baulk. Freyberg would naturally do his duty and obey orders but he was, of course, subject to separate political constraints in that he reported directly to the home government. Wavell was not to be deflected; he
Blame for the eventual defeat was shunted onto Wavell, tidily ignoring the immense practical difficulties confronting GHQ Cairo and disregarding the natural obstacles created by the topography. To establish a viable route to the south coast (the road to Sphakia was incomplete) would have been a major engineering feat, impossible in the time available and, even if completed, suicidal for convoys in the face of German air power. It can also be said that it was the decision to engage the enemy on the mainland that diverted attention away from Crete. Had the concept of the island fortress been actioned at the start of 1941 then history might have taken a different course.
Greece had eaten into Wavellâs supplies, meagre at best, to an alarming degree:
The loss of men was ⦠mercifully lighter than it might have been: 2000 had been killed or wounded and 4000 made prisoner out of 58000 troops sent to Greece. But the loss of materiel was disastrous: 104 tanks, 40 anti aircraft guns, 193 field guns, 1812 machine guns, about 8000 transport vehicles, most of the signals equipment, inestimable quantities of stores and 209 aircraft⦠24
With the mainland lost Churchill moved the island up to a higher slot in the list of priorities â the question was whether to seek to hold Crete or withdraw all units to North Africa. The Prime Minister had no doubts:
Crete must be held [he instructed Wavell on 17 April] ⦠and you should provide for this in the re-distribution of your forces. It is important that strong elements of Greek Army should establish themselves in Crete, together with King and Government.. we shall aid and maintain defence of Crete to the utmost. 25
The decision was taken and he would not brook any contrary opinion; Cunningham was rebuked for expressing reservations. Wilson then sent his pessimistic but realistic assessment but the die was firmly cast. With ULTRA intelligence now playing a part, 26 Churchill launched fully into bulldog mode: âIt seems from our information that a heavy airborne attack by German troops and bombers will soon be made on Crete ⦠It ought to be a fine opportunity for killing parachute troops. The island must be stubbornly defended.â 27 Moreover, the PM knew just the man to exploit this heaven-sent opportunity for slaughtering the enemy.
General Bernard Freyberg was indeed a Herculean figure â physically imposing and utterly fearless, he had served with considerable distinction during the Great War and had won the Victoria Cross. Churchill regarded him with some reverence. Although born in New Zealand, most of his life and career had been in Britain. When the Prime Minister, meeting the General in the 1920s, begged him to âstrip his sleeve and show his scarsâ , he counted no less than twenty-seven old wounds.
It was to this officer, the doyen of fighting soldiers, that Wavell turned at the end of April. He had lost confidence in Wilson who clearly had little confidence of his ability to hold the island. Flying to Maleme on 30 April, the commander-in-chief interviewed Wilson and informed him of his decision to post him to the Levant. Having disposed of one commander he then spoke privately to Freyberg who was nearby. After congratulating the General on the performance of his Kiwis in Greece he dropped the apparent bombshell that Freyberg was now to command in Crete.
Perhaps any general, on being entrusted with so difficult an enterprise, would baulk. Freyberg would naturally do his duty and obey orders but he was, of course, subject to separate political constraints in that he reported directly to the home government. Wavell was not to be deflected; he
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