Operation Mercury by John Sadler Page B

time persisting in the Homeric view that the able-bodied Kiwis would relish a straight fight with an enemy, who lacked the decisive support of tanks and heavy guns, ‘on which he so largely relies’.
    Part of the difficulty lay in Freyberg’s own mercurial temperament. He certainly lacked faith in his own capabilities and yet was motivated by an admirable sense of duty. His mood swung from almost feverish optimism to deep despair. This may, at least in part, explain 28 that when he wrote to Churchill on 5 May his tone was far more bullish: ‘…cannot understand nervousness; am not in the least anxious about airborne attack; have made my dispositions and feel can cope adequately with the troops at my disposal.’ 29
    Was it simply the case that, having been entrusted with his mission by Churchill, Freyberg simply felt he could not pass the challenge. The effect of the Prime Minister’s charisma should not be overlooked. If the politician admired the soldier then the soldier was bound to do his utmost to conform to the image he had inspired. There were few men of whom Churchill would write:
    At the outset of the War no man was more fitted to command the New Zealand Division, for which he was eagerly chosen. In September 1940, I had toyed with the idea of giving him a far greater scope … Freyberg is so made that he will fight for King and country with an unconquerable heart anywhere he is ordered, and with whatever forces he is given by superior authorities, and he imparts his own invincible firmness of mind to all around him. 30
    Stirring stuff but it betrays the great man’s romantic weakness of assuming that a strong heart and a just cause can overcome all odds. Modern warfare is not that accommodating; it is, in part, an industrial process, weight of men, matériel, supply and above all air power will generally decide the issue. Both men fell into the same trap, Churchill elevated the hero and the hero had to conform, whatever his professional misgivings.
    Supply was an immediate problem. German bombing had made Souda too hot a landfall in daylight hours and ships had to be unloaded in darkness. Damaged ships lay lifeless in the water and their precious cargoes, needed to supply such a swollen garrison, had to be manhandled. In the first three weeks of May, immediately prior to the attack, some 27,000 tons of munitions were embarked for Crete but only a pitiful percentage, some 3,000 tons, reached the dockside.
    The situation did begin to improve somewhat when Major Torr took over responsibility, backed by contingents of Australian volunteers, from engineering units and 2/2nd Field Regiment. 31 The increased energy and efficiency had an effect, some Bren carriers, apparently lost on a half submerged wreck, were ingeniously salvaged and made operational. A frantic nightly run by fast destroyers, speeding into Souda, unloading and dashing back to Alexandria under the sheltering blanket of darkness, also eased the crisis.
    Additional arms in the shape of a motley collection of French and captured Italian 75-mm and 100-mm guns, a battery of mountain guns, 3.7-in howitzers, together with assorted armour, sixteen light and half a dozen infantry tanks were obtained. 32 The MNBDO were a considerable addition in themselves, apart from the 2,200 marines, they were fully equipped with light and heavy AA guns, searchlights and some formidable 4-in naval guns. A brace of fresh contingents which, like MNBDO, had not been exposed to the debacle in Greece, 2nd Leicester and 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, came ashore.
    Admiral Cunningham, whatever his reservations about the safety of his fleet exposed in open waters to an enemy with full control of the skies, had pulled together two ‘heavy’ flotillas and seven ‘light’. The battlecruisers with their massive 15-in guns stalked the western approaches to deter any intervention by the Italian Navy, while the squadrons prowled the